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Federalism and State Regulation of
the Production of Natural Gas - The
Supreme Court Revisits Preemption
PATRICK H. MARTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 1989 Congress removed federal wellhead price con-
trols on natural gas production.' That act does not address state
regulation of natural gas production directly. However, its pas-
sage should be the occasion for reexamining the role of the states
in regulating gas production to prevent waste and protect cor-
relative rights. The partial removal of federal wellhead price
controls on natural gas which was accomplished through the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 19782 was initially viewed by the
United States Supreme Court as not affecting federal preemption
of state regulation of deregulated natural gas.' Yet a more recent
decision suggests that the subject may need to be reconsidered.
4
This paper reviews the federal courts' recent decisions on
state regulation of natural gas production and suggests the ap-
propriate course for the United States Supreme Court to take
when it again has occasion to rule on the scope of state regu-
lation of natural gas production. The paper also discusses the
problems of applying ratable take and conservation statutes to
competing wells in the same reservoir and to wells in different
* Patrick H. Martin is Campanile Professor of Mineral Law at the Paul M.
Herbert Law Center at Louisiana State University. From 1982 to 1984 he served as the
Commissioner of Conservation for the State of Louisiana.
I Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
3 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409
(1986) (Transco).
4 See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 860 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, Corp. Comm'n v. ANR Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1967 (1989).
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reservoirs. However, it does not address the problem of sharing
production from the single unit well.'
II. TBE T.ANsco DEcisioN
The leading case concerning state regulation of pipeline gas
purchase and take practices is the United States Supreme Court
decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Coproration v. State
Oil and Gas Board.6 In this case the Court invalidated the
Mississippi ratable take regulation. Prior to Transco, the United
States Supreme Court had passed on the constitutionality of
ratable take or related statutes on at least four occasions.
The first occasion was in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpo-
ration Commission.' The Court upheld a prorationing program
of Oklahoma which included authorizing the Corporation Com-
mission to:
so regulate the taking of crude oil or petroleum from any or
all such common sources of supply, within the state of Okla-
homa, as to prevent the inequitable or unfair taking, from a
common source of supply, of such crude oil or petroleum, by
any person, firm, or corporation, and to prevent unreasonable
discrimination in favor of any one such common source of
supply against another.'
The program was not repugnant to the due process or equal
protection clauses because it prevented waste and protected oth-
ers' rights in the common source of supply. 9 Nor did the program
burden interstate commerce, because the regulations applied to
production and not transportation.' 0
Without disturbing the holding in Champlin, in 1937 in
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp." the Court in-
validated a Texas Railroad Commission proration order. That
See Seal v. Corp. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986), dismissed for want of
properly presented federal question sub nor Amerada Hess Corp. v. Corp. Comm'n,
479 U.S. 1073, (1987); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 376 (La. App., 1987),
writs denied, 520 So.2d 118 (La. 1988). On the Oklahoma regulatory program see
Pilcher, Oil and Gas: H.B. 1221: Protection of Correlative Rights in the Absence of
Waste, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 127 (1987).
6 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
7 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
8 C.O.S. 1921, § 7957 is reproduced at 286 U.S. 223-24.
9 Champlin, 286 U.S. at 232-235.
10 Id. at 235.
1 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
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order forced a purchase of gas in a field by certain companies
that owned their own interest in production which they trans-
ported through their own facilities for their own consumption;
the parties complaining were not purchasers of gas.' 2 The Court
found that the purpose of the prorationing order was the same
as the purpose of the Common Purchaser Act passed by the
Texas legislature in 1931 but found unconstitutional by a lower
court as a taking of property. 3 Under the prorationing order or
under the common purchaser statute:
the State takes from the pipe line owner the money with which
the purchase is made, the money lost through curtailed use of
properties developed at large expense, the money lost because
of the drainage away from his land of the gas which he is
forbidden to produce for himself, but must buy from those
towards whose lands it migrates.14
The distinction the Court drew from Champlin was that the gas
was owned by the party taking gas from the field and no threat
of waste was shown."5
In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co.,16 the
Court affirmed the judgment reached in the Champlin decision
that ratable take legislation was valid. The Peerless case chal-
lenged not only Oklahoma's ratable take requirements but also
a regulation fixing a minimum price for natural gas. Perhaps
the Court's apparent belief that ratable take/common purchaser
regulation is a mechanism for price raising resulted from the
unfortunate joinder of these issues in Peerless. In any event, the
Supreme Court upheld both in Peerless, stating:
[tihat a legitimate local interest is at stake in this case is clear.
A state is justifiably concerned with preventing rapid and
uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources.
The contention urged by appellant that a group of private
producers and royalty owners derive substantial gain from the
regulations does not contradict the established connection be-
tween the orders and a state-wide interest in conservation.
12 Id. at 77-79.
Id. at 79 (quoting Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 59 F.2d 750
(W. D. Tex. 1932)).
'" Id.
See Thompson, 300 U.S. at 76-77.
16 Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950), affm'g
220 P.2d 279 (1950).
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We recognize that there is also a strong national interest in
natural gas problems. But it is far from clear that on balance
such interest is harmed by the state regulations under attack
here . . . . Insofar as conservation is concerned, the national
interest and the interest of producing states may well tend to
coincide. 17
The Court observed that it was not deciding the power of the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) to set well-head prices. How-
ever, this appeared to have more to do with the minimum price
setting aspect of the challenge to the state regulation and not
the context of the ratable take requirement.'"
In 1954 the Court ruled in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wis-
consin that the FPC had a duty to regulate well-head prices of
natural gas. 19 The state programs that had been upheld only a
short time earlier were now thought to pose a conflict with
exclusive federal authority and therefore could no longer stand.
Thus, the Oklahoma program establishing a minimum price for
natural gas which had just been upheld in Peerless was struck
down due to its conflict with federal authority.20 Similarly, the
Kansas ratable take statute was invalidated in Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission.
2
1
The Northern Natural litigation involved Kansas' natural gas
producing Hugoton Field. Northern Natural's pipeline was con-
nected to 1,100 gas wells in the field. In 1959 the Kansas Cor-
poration Commission ordered Northern Natural to purchase
ratably from all 1,100 wells. In 1960 this order was superseded
by a general order to all natural gas purchasers. The Court
found these orders presented Northern Natural with the alter-
natives of complying with the obligations of a contract with one
producer, Republic, and "increasing its takes from the other
producers' wells - thus taking more gas from Kansas than it
could currently use - or of risking liability for a breach of the
Republic contract by decreasing its takes from the Republic wells
below the allowables."
2 2
Due to this conflict, the orders invaded the exclusive juris-
diction of the FPC. The regulations did not come under the
1 Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188-89.
'9 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1954).
21 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
Id. at 89.
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Natural Gas Act's production or gathering exception to FPC
jurisdiction because Northern was a purchaser and its activities
did not involve production and gathering. Quoting from Phillips,
the Court said: "Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation of 'all wholesales of natural gas in interstate
commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not and whether
occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate
pipeline company.' "23
The Court ruled that the "federal regulatory scheme leaves
no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of inter-
state wholesales of natural gas . . . or for state regulations which
would indirectly achieve the same result." 24 The orders interfered
with the FPC's ability to regulate gas transportation and sale
and its ability to achieve uniformity of regulation. The Court
said the orders "shift to the shoulders of interstate purchasers
the burden of performing the complex task of balancing the
output of thousands of natural gas wells within the state, a task
which would otherwise presumably be the State Commis-
sion's. ' 25 The adjustments a pipeline might have to make might
impair the ability of the FPC to "regulate the intricate relation-
ship between the purchaser's cost structures and eventual costs
to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States."
' 26
Although federal and state programs did not necessarily have to
collide, the Court found that "there lurks such imminent pos-
sibility of collision in orders purposely directed at interstate
wholesale purchasers that the orders must be declared a nullity
in order to assure the effectuation of the comprehensive federal
regulation ordained by Congress.
'
"27
The Court noted the state's concern with allocating and
conserving scarce natural resources, but said it would have to
I2 d. at 91 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682
(1954)).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 92. The court was, however, taking from the state agency the principal
mechanism for balancing output and was leaving it to the pipeline to control its takes
contract by contract, well by well, balance or no balance.
I Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 92.
17 Id. For an interesting historical analysis see Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and
Gas Conservation Regulation with the Natural Gas Act: New Statutory Revelations,
1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 9. In this article Professor David Pierce makes the argument that
Article 11 of the Natural Gas Act, which deals with the creation of interstate compacts
for natural gas conservation, should be the focal point in analysis of congressional intent
to preempt state conservation regulation.
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find a way that did not threaten the federal regulatory scheme.
The Court went so far as to suggest that the state could have
achieved the same result by ordering the producer to decrease
production. 2 If the state could not conserve natural resources
without conflicting with the federal program, then conservation
would have to fall. But the Court suggested that the FPC could
consider conservation factors in certification proceedings.
29
Champlin was distinguished on the ground that it dealt with
production. The cases "have consistently recognized a significant
distinction, which bears directly upon the constitutional conse-
quences, between conservation measures aimed directly at inter-
state purchasers and wholesales for resale, and those aimed at
producers and production." 0
The Northern Natural decision was reexamined by the Court
in 1986 in Transco. The litigation giving rise to it began in July
1982, when Coastal Exploration, Inc. filed a petition with the
State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi, asking the Board to
enforce its Statewide Rule 48, a "ratable-take" requirement,
against Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (Transco).
Coastal was a nonoperating working interest owner in the Harper
Sand Pool. Rule 48 provides that "[elach person now or here-
after engaged in the business of purchasing oil or gas from
owners, operators, or producers shall purchase without discrim-
ination in favor of one owner, operator, or producer against
another in the same source of supply."'"
After a hearing, the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board found
Transco in violation of Rule 48. Transco was ordered to take
gas ratably (i.e., in proportion to the various owners' shares)
from the Harper Sand Pool and to purchase the gas under
nondiscriminatory price and take-or-pay conditions.
The situation which the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board was
addressing is depicted in the following simplified hypothetical
diagram:
28 Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 94-95, n.12.
Id. at 95-96. The federal commission had no authority over production or
gathering of natural gas. The allusion to "conservation" that the majority made was to
end use of the gas, an area in which the FPC had jurisdiction by virtue of certification
of a sale in the public interest, an area in which the commission was not excluded from
jurisdiction by the Natural Gas Act. Besides, there was and could be no practical method
of conditioning a certificate on the basis of balancing of takes to prevent waste. There
was no mechanism at the federal level for administration of such a program.
Id. at 94.
Transco, 474 U.S. at 414.
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Take = 5000 Pipeline
Take = 100
Allowable on each well: 5,000 MCF/day
Daily take by pipeline: as shown
Effect: uncompensated drainage
3 2
When Transco appealed the Board decision, it was affirmed
by the Mississippi courts.33 The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled
that the ratable take requirement did not impose a burden on
interstate commerce and the Natural Gas Act34 no longer pre-
empted state regulation because the Natural Gas Policy Act"
had deregulated the gas in question. The Court did rule that the
Board could not impose a price on the pipeline equal to the
contract price of the other producers. Rather, the price to be
paid was to be a reasonable price determined by reference to
prevailing market conditions and other appropriate economic
considerations .36
11 It should be observed that A, B, and D may never make up their lost production
if the reservoir is water driven and their wells water out before they have an opportunity
to make up underages.
1 Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board, 457 So.2d
1298 (Miss. 1984), rev'd, 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
" Transco, 457 So.2d at 1318. The gas was considered § 107 gas.
Id. at 1331. For another analysis of the Mississippi decision, see Williams,
Federal Preemption of State Conservation Laws After the Natural Gas Policy Act: A
Preliminary Look, 56 COLO. L. REV. 521 (1985).
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi decided to reject consid-
eration of the role of ratable take regulation in prevention of
waste. The Mississippi Court apparently did not understand what
the arguments were in regard to waste. Apparently the Court
did not think it needed to understand them in light of the rest
of their rulings. This was in spite of the fact that the Court had
earlier noted that if Transco only takes the gas for which it
contracted, then the gas left in the pool will be harder to get.
37
This should have suggested to the Court that the gas that re-
mained would be less likely to be produced.
However the United States Supreme Court struck down the
Mississippi Oil and Gas Board's ratable take order in Transcon-
tinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board.18 This
decision was perhaps abetted by the Mississippi court's refusal
to consider the waste issue seriously.
The Court's majority restated the holding in Northern Nat-
ural without reexamining its basic propositions. The Northern
Natural analysis was that Congress had created a comprehensive
regulatory scheme and ratable take orders fell within the limits
of that scheme rather than within the category of regulatory
questions reserved for the states. Also in the absence of ratable-
take requirements, purchasers would choose a different, and
presumably less costly, purchasing pattern.39 In neither Northern
Natural nor Transco did the Supreme Court indicate any evi-
dence of a congressional intent to preempt the states' authority.
The Transco court confronted the fact that the well-head
price control program no longer applied to the gas involved in
the Mississippi litigation. The majority opinion by Justice Black-
mun said the question was not whether FERC has power over
the gas but whether Congress "intended to give the States the
power it had denied FERC." 4 In an effort to find a Congres-
1, Transco, 457 So.2d at 1310.
39 474 U.S. 409 (1986). See Martin, State Regulation of Natural Gas Production:
Is There Life After Transco?, 38 Sw. LEGAL FDN. On. & GAS INST. 10-1 (1987); Martin,
Regulation of Gas Production Rates and Imbalances after Transco v. Oil & Gas Board,
27 WASHBURN L.J. 298 (1988); Pierce, State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally
Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15
(1988); Note, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi:
The Demise of State Ratable-Take Requirements?, 8 J. OF ENERGY L. & POLICY 285
(1987); Grower & Montjoy, State Regulation of Natural Gas After Transco, 2 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 15 (Spring 1987).
39 Transco, 474 U.S. 420. See also text accompanying notes 21-30.
,o Id. at 422.
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sional intent to preempt state regulation, the opinion said that
"[tlo the extent that Congress denied FERC the power to reg-
ulate affirmatively particular aspects of the first sale of gas, it
did so because it wanted to leave determination of supply and
first-sale price to the market." ' 41 The opinion stated the Missis-
sippi order upset the federal scheme because it made the inter-
state pipelines comply with state regulations.
42
The Court followed Transco in Schneidewind v. ANR Pipe-
line Company43 and held that the Michigan statute required any
public utility transporting natural gas to get the Michigan Public
Service Commission approval before long-term securities could
be issued. 44 Certain natural gas companies regulated by FERC
challenged MPSC's jurisdiction to enforce Act 144, since it was
preempted by the NGA and violated the Commerce Clause. The
Court held that NGA preempted this state regulation. 45 As in
Transco, because the court concluded that the NGA preempted
Act 144, the majority did not need to decide whether, absent
federal occupation of the field, Act 144 violated the Commerce
Clause. 46 The Court concluded that Act 144 was a regulation of
the rates and facilities of natural gas companies used in trans-
portation and sale for resale of natural gas in interstate com-
merce. 47 Thus, it was preempted. When applied to natural gas
companies, Act 144 amounted to a regulation of rates and
facilities, a field occupied by federal regulation. The objectives
sought by Act 144 were the same as those sought by the NGA.
The court stated:
[b]y keeping a natural gas company from raising its equity
levels above a certain point, Michigan seeks to ensure that the
company will charge only what Michigan considers to be a
"reasonable rate." This is regulation of rates. The other aim
of Act 144, seeking to ensure that a company is financed in a
way that will allow proper maintenance of its facilities and
continuance of its services, for the benefit of both ratepayers
4 Id.
4z Id. at 423.
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Company, 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
"Id.
, Id. at 306-07.
Id. at 311. The Sixth Circuit had held the regulation invalid on both grounds -
801 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1986). The Michigan Supreme Court had gone the other way -
Michigan Gas Storage Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 457 (1979).
1 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308.
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and investors, also falls within FERC's exclusive purview since
those facilities are a critical part of the transportation of
natural gas and sale for resale in interstate commerce. In short,
the things Act 144 regulation is directed at, the control of rates
and facilities of natural gas companies, are precisely the things
over which FERC has comprehensive authority.
4 s
The Court also made a distinction between direct and indirect
regulation. Merely having an effect on a natural gas company
was not enough to lead to applying the preemption doctrine.
49
Hypothetical conflicts were not enough to preempt; the possi-
bility of conflict had to be imminent.50 Here the possibility of
collision between Act 144 and the NGA was imminent. The
Court observed that:
if the MPSC ever denied a natural gas company authority to
issue a security under Act 144 for a FERC-approved project,
the disagreement between state and federal authorities over the
wisdom of the project and its proposed financing would inter-
fere with the federal regulatory scheme. Furthermore, any
state-ordered alteration in a company's capital structure would
impinge on the federal ratemaking authority."1
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN NORTHWEST CENTRAL
A. State Regulation
The Hugoton Field is approximately 160 miles long and 40
to 72 miles wide. Two-thirds of the field lies in western Kansas
and the remainder extends into Oklahoma and Texas. The over
4,000 gas wells in the Kansas portion of the field connect to a
number of major pipelines including five major interstate lines.
The basic proration order for the Hugoton Field first adopted
March 21, 1944 employed a deliverability formula for the use
of assigning allowables to the wells producing from the field.
The Corporation Commission established production toler-
ances for overproduction and underproduction to give flexibility
49 Id.
41 Id. The court stated: "Of course, every state statute that has some indirect
effect on rates and facilities of natural gas companies is not preempted."
o Id. at 310.
51 Id.
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to producers. The tolerance provisions are set forth in paragraph
"p" of the basic proration order. With many wells and many
units, a constant imbalance exists among the producers in the
field. Some units are overproduced and others are underprod-
uced. Market changes sufficient to make up underages have
taken six to ten years. The underages are sometimes cancelled
by the Kansas Corporation Commission, which has had a policy
of reinstating cancelled underages under certain circumstances.
Other state commissions cancel underages in as short a time as
a year.
5 2
On February 16, 1983, the Commission amended paragraph
"p" of the basic proration order for the field for the purpose
of reducing underages. This was based on a finding that the
field was coming out of balance due to accumulating underages
creating non-uniform drainage. The Corporation Commission
established the parameters within which cancelled underages had
to be reinstated or permanently cancelled. Apparently the Com-
mission wanted to encourage increased production from the
field. 3
Several producers and pipelines took the Commission to
court on both state and federal grounds. As a result the Kansas
Supreme Court considered whether the Commission was adher-
ing to the appropriate concept of correlative rights in Northwest
Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Commission.14 The chal-
lengers argued that the Commission improperly limited correla-
tive rights to that which could be currently produced. 5 Although
,2 See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1002
(1986) and Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 699 P.2d 1002
(1985). For a view that cancellation of underages is an unconstitutional confiscation of
property, see Note, Natural Gas Regulation and Vested Property Interests: Ratable
Taking, Proration Standards, and Fieldwide Civil Liability, 62 Tax. L. REv. 691, 726-
28 (1983).
11 Martin, Regulation of Gas Production Rates and Imbalances After Transco v.
Oil & Gas Board, 27 WAsHBiRN L.J. 298 (1988). According to a report in the Oil and
Gas Journal ("OGJ Newsletter," p. 2 August 24, 1987), the Hugoton Field produced
268 billion cubic feet of gas in 1986, down 15% from 1985.
' Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 699 P.2d 1002 (1985).
"Correlative rights" has been defined by the KCC in the past as follows: " 'Correlative
rights' means that each owner or producer in a common source of supply is privileged
to produce from that supply only in a manner or amount that will not injure the
reservoir to the detriment of others, take an undue proportion of the obtainable oil or
gas, or cause undue drainage between developed leases." Id. at 1010 quoting K.A.R.
82-3-101(15).
55 Id.
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the Court agreed with the challengers on this point, the contro-
versy was not resolved because the Commission provided an
opportunity to reinstate the cancelled underages.16 This appar-
ently was sufficient.
The plaintiffs also challenged the Commission's setting of
allowables in such a manner as to encourage production. First
they argued that the order was unreasonable because it would
not result in increased production since pipelines would not want
to increase take-or-pay problems elsewhere. Secondly they ar-
gued that it would cause waste due to increased production.1
7
The court characterized the Commission's action as follows:
The KCC's dilemma is apparent. It was concerned about the
dramatic decline in production from Hugoton and its effect
on owners, producers and consumers. It sought ways to in-
crease Hugoton production. It increased allowables in spite of
reduced purchaser nominations and other evidence of less mar-
ket demand. As a result, the disparity between overproducers
and underproducers increased. It is arguable whether reduced
production from the field was caused by a conscious choice of
producers and purchasers to supply their demands from other
sources and make Hugoton Field a storage facility or whether
it was simply caused by reduced market demand. The KCC
believed the former and amended paragraph (p) of the basic
order to provide an incentive for production by permanently
canceling underages if not recovered on an accelerated sched-
ule .... [W]e find there was substantial competent evidence
to support the KCC's conclusion that correlative rights were
being compromised by the excessive underages .... While sell-
ing gas is not a function of the KCC, except tangentially
through setting allowables, nor is the providing of incentives
for additional production a KCC function, when additional
production is needed to protect correlative rights, the KCC has
authority to create such incentives. 8
Because the field is an old one, the contracts had take-or-
pay requirements unlike those in newer purchases. Thus pipelines
were swinging off the field (i.e., leaving the gas in the ground
to favor takes elsewhere) where they had take-or-pay problems.
The pipelines were in effect using the Hugoton Field for storage.
6 Id. at 1011.
" Id. at 1012-13.
'8 Id. at 1016.
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Much of the gas was subject to very low prices, whether from
contract or regulation. These combined factors made pipeline
take decisions result in higher gas prices.5 9
The operation and effect of the Kansas Corporation Com-
mission allowables order is depicted in the following diagram.
Northwest Central
A A:
Allowable: 10,000 MCF Allowable: 10,000 MCF
Production: 4,000 MCF Production: 9,000 MCF
Underage: 6,000 MCF Underage: 1,000 MCF
Net effect of cancellation of underages: drainage from A to B.
B. The Kansas Supreme Court Opinion
The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the assertions that the
Commission order improperly interfered with federal regulation
of natural gas in interstate commerce. 60 The basis for asserting
interference was that if "purchasers decided to divert purchases
from other fields to prevent the cancellation of underages in
Hugoton [it] would decrease production from other fields in
other states." 1 The trial court accepted the premise that the
amendment would cause a change in the mix of natural gas
which pipelines transport for sale. However the trial court and
'9 Northwest Central Pipeline, 699 P.2d at 1015. Note the testimony of the witness.
I0 d. at 1002.
Id. at 1017.
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the Kansas Supreme Court concluded this was not preempted
because the order dealt with producers rather than specifically
ordering the purchasers to do anything. The order thus fell
within the production and gathering exemption of the Natural
Gas Act. Stated the court: "[tfhe rules on underages are a part
of production regulation and thus are not violative of the federal
act, even though purchasers are indirectly caught in the back-
wash."
62
Chief Justice Schroeder vigorously dissented on the grounds
that state authority had been preempted here by Northern Nat-
ural. In his view, the state order had the indirect result of
infringing on the exclusive authority of FERC.
63
C. The Kansas Supreme Court Opinion on Remand
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Kansas deci-
sion on February 24, 1986 on the basis of Transco and remanded
it for a determination in light of Transco.64 The oral arguments
were made to the Kansas Supreme Court in December 1986 and
the decision of the Court was handed down on February 20,
1987.65
The Kansas Court concluded that the decision in Transco
was not inconsistent with the position the Court had taken when
it upheld the Corporation Commission's order.66 The Court's
test used to determine federal jurisdiction was whether the reg-
ulation affects the marketing activities which are federal
responsibility67 or production activities which are reserved to the
state. 6 The Kansas order was not directed at pipelines but at
producers. Any effect on interstate sales was incidental to an
order which had as its objective preventing waste and protecting
correlative rights. 69
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Kansas Su-
preme Court's decision in Northwest Central Pipeline Corpora-
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1022-23.
- 475 U.S. 1002 (1986).
65 Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Corp. Comm'n, 732 P.2d 775 (1987).
Id. at 779.
67 Id. at 780.
6 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
6 Northwest Central Pipeline, 732 P.2d at 780.
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tion v. State Corporation Commission.7 ° The Court held that
Congress had not preempted the Kansas Corporation Commis-
sion regulation through the Natural Gas Act,71 which expressly
reserved regulating allowables to the states.72 By exempting pro-
duction or gathering, Congress manifested its intent not to in-
terfere with the states' traditional power to regulate production
- and therefore rates of production over time - as a means
of conserving natural resources and protecting producers' cor-
relative rights. 7 The Kansas Corporation Commission)s regula-
tion represented precisely the sort of schemes that Congress
intended to leave within a state's authority.
The Court used a bright-line test for determining the power
of the state conservation agencies. Regulation directed at prod-
ucers is not preempted, while regulation directed at interstate
pipelines is. One facile approach then is simply to inquire whether
the regulation looks to the production of the gas or whether it
operates on the pipeline taker of the gas. But the bright-line test
is a conclusion, not an analysis. One must ask why the regulation
with a more direct impact on the pipeline is preempted.
In his opinion, Justice Brennan blended two themes in the
discussion of preemption. 74 One theme looks primarily to the
Natural Gas Act of 193871 for the preemption of state regulation
by Congress and the other looks to the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA)76 for the preemption. This paper will term these
the FERC regulation rationale and the free-market rationale.
While these were both brought out in Transco, the free-market
rationale was emphasized more in Northwest Central than it had
been before.
The FERC regulation rationale came from Congress's estab-
lishment in 1938 of a comprehensive scheme for regulating the
interstate pipeline business. 77 FERC occupies this field78 and any
10 Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 1262
(1989).
71 Id. at 1276.
72 Id. at 1275.
71 Id. at 1274.
' Id. at 1271. It should be observed that the Transco decision had been on a 5-4
vote. The changes in the court since Transco suggest that the dormant commerce clause
issue that was not answered in Transco would not stand today.
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1983).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1983).
77 Id. at § 717.
78 Id. at § 717(b).
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state regulation that interferes with FERC's regulatory program
is preempted.
The free-market rationale is that Congress preempted state
regulation because the NGPA establishes an unrestrained na-
tional market for natural gas.79 State regulation that interferes
with the free market is invalid as inconsistent with this congres-
sional purpose. The blending of the two themes for preemption
is seen in the following statement from the Northwest Central
opinion:
In Northern Natural, we held that rateable-take orders "in-
validly invade[d] the federal agency's exclusive domain" pre-
cisely because they were "unmistakably and unambiguously
directed at purchasers." . . . Interstate pipelines operate within
the field reserved under the NGA for federal regulation, buying
gas in one State and transporting it for resale in another, so
inevitably the States are preempted from directly regulating
these pipelines in such a way as to affect their cost struc-
tures .... Likewise in Transco, in which we considered whether
the rule in Northern Natural had survived deregulation of
many interstate rates by the NGPA, we held that federal
authority over transportation and rates - now expressed in a
determination that rates should be unregulated and settled by
market forces - continued to occupy the field and to preempt
state rateable-take orders directed to pipelines and forcing
upon them certain purchasing patterns. (Emphasis in original.
Footnote omitted.) 80
But the regulation of producers has as great an impact on the
gas market as a rateable take requirement.81 The Brennan opin-
ion cited no evidence of congressional intent to preempt such
state regulation and, in fact, determined that the legislative
history suggests the opposite.8 2 The power the producing states
were recognized to have when the Natural Gas Act was passed
included the power to control ratable taking.8 3
The Supreme Court overlooked a significant feature of the
NGPA in both Transco and Northwest Central. The NGPA
79 Id. at § 3331.
'o Northwest Central Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1275-76.
' 699 P.2d at 1016-17.
'2 109 S. Ct. at 1274.
" See Pierce, supra note 27.
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clarified the role of the state conservation agencies. 84 Congress
expressly left it to the state agencies to make determinations that
directly affected the price for which natural gas could be sold. 5
Moreover, Congress expressly left it to the states to limit the
price of natural gas in specified circumstances.8 6 The NGPA's
free market program was meant to remove federal wellhead price
controls, not to free gas from state conservation regulations.
The congressional action partially overcame the disastrous effects
of the Supreme Court's 1954 Phillips decision. The NGPA did
not speak to the problems of state regulation of natural gas any
more than removal of federal price controls on oil pertained to
state regulation of oil production. The 1989 legislation completes
the removal of federal wellhead price controls.
The Kansas allowables formula was not preempted because
the Kansas regulations required nothing of pipelines. Although
the regulation might result in pipeline companies making pur-
chasing decisions that affected their cost structures and hence
the rates, this was not enough to lead to a conclusion that
Congress intended to preempt such regulation.
The Court was influenced in part by the fact that the United
States filed a brief saying it would monitor the operation of the
Kansas regulation. The Court observed that "the Federal Gov-
ernment assures us that . . . FERC will recognize Kansas' order
as part of the environment in which appellant conducts its busi-
ness, and will make its own decisions with that in mind." 87
Earlier in the litigation, FERC evidently sided with the pipelines
and made a claim that the Kansas regulation would run afoul
of the Natural Gas Act because it allowed gas dedicated to
interstate commerce to be lost through drainage to the intrastate
market. The Northwest Central opinion expressly rejects that
theory of dedication. 8
, See 124 CONG. REC. 38, 366 (1978) (states may use their traditional powers to
regulate matters including "drilling locations, collection techniques, [and] production
rates").
85 Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 3413(c); 769 P.2d 1, 16-17 (Kan. 1989) (the states'
authority included a determination that additional wells were necessary in a field to
effectively and efficiently drain a reservoir).
" 15 U.S.C. § 3432(a). See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light
Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
87 Northwest Central Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1277.
" Id. at 1279. The Northwest court says, "Insofar as appellants' argument is that
cancellation of underages as pursuant to paragraph (p) work an abandonment through
the noncompensable drainage of dedicated reserves, and that Kansas therefore regulates
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Brennan's opinion for the Court recognized the legitimacy
of the states' concerns, both for preventing waste and for pro-
tecting correlative rights. The refreshing new emphasis on the
legitimate interests of the producing states in the Northwest
Central opinion points the way to a future reconsideration of
the Transco decision, particularly in a case involving physical
waste of natural gas. The Court determined "the avowed pur-
pose in adopting paragraph (p) was to protect the correlative
rights of Kansas producers."8 9 Protection of correlative rights is
traditionally left to the state and Kansas' regulation "was plau-
sibly related to its stated and legitimate goal of protecting cor-
relative rights. "90
The Northwest Central Court did address the unresolved
issue in Transco of whether the state regulation constituted a
burden on interstate commerce or the dormant commerce clause
issue. 9' The regulation was not found to impermissibly burden
interstate commerce. 92 The court stated:
loin its face, paragraph (p) is neutral, providing for the can-
cellation of underages of producers irrespective of whether they
supply the intra- or interstate markets. In that respect it is
entirely unlike the statute we struck down in Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), which required pipelines
to meet the demand of local consumers before supplying the
interstate market.
93
Nor did the effects make the regulation violate the commerce
clause:
Congress cannot but have contemplated that state oversight of
production would have some effect on interstate com-
merce .... We are not prepared to render meaningless Con-
gress' sweeping saving of power over production to the States
by holding that a regulation intended to protect correlative
rights by encouraging production of allowables, aimed at prod-
ucers and requiring nothing of purchasers, per se violates the
in a field Congress has fully occupied, it is plainly meritless .... The KCC's regulation
governs the rights of producers to take gas from Hugoton field, and determining rates
of production is a matter squarely within the State's jurisdiction. .... "
9 Id. at 1278.
90Id.
91 Id. at 1280.
92 Northwest Central Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1282.
91 Id. at 1280-81.
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dormant Commerce Clause because purchasers have to take it
into account in deciding whence to take gas and may as a
result increase takes from in-state producers. 94
IV. WHAT REMAINS TO BE DECIDED - THE FUTURE OF
NORTHWEST CENTRAL
A. The ANR Litigation
The Supreme Court recently passed up an opportunity to
expand upon the deference it showed to state conservation pro-
grams in Northwest Central. It denied certiorari in a case that
invalidated the Oklahoma ratable take regulations."
Prior to the issuance of a new ratable take order, Order No.
281285, 96 the Oklahoma Corporation Commission sent clear sig-
nals about its intentions by filing a Notice of Inquiry and Motion
to Consolidate Causes in response to numerous causes filed
seeking ratable taking. 97 A hearing panel heard arguments on
the issues of whether Oklahoma was preempted by the commerce
clause from enforcing the rateable take provision of the Okla-
homa statutes and whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission had sole jurisdiction over the regulation of gas purchases
by interstate pipelines under the NGA and NGPA. 98 On Septem-
ber 4, 1984, the panel issued its report recommending that the
questions be answered in the negative, finding that Oklahoma
was not preempted from enforcing ratable take requirements
from interstate pipelines. 99 This was followed by the Commission
issuing Order No. 281285 which ruled the same way on the issues
of the commerce clause burden and preemption.1°
The Commission's analysis was similar to that of the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court's in the Transco case. However, reference
" Id. at 1281. The court also applied the "balancing test" of Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Id. at 1282. The challenged program regulated
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate
commerce were only incidental.
91 ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 860 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, Corp. Comm'n v. ANR Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1967 (1989).
9 Issued in General Cause No. 28770, July 3, 1985.
ANR Pipeline, 860 F.2d at 1575.
Corporation Commission Order No. 254451, February 27, 1984.
ANR Pipeline, 860 F.2d at 1575.
'c General Cause No. 28770, 17-18.
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was made to preventing waste.' 0' The discussion of the subject
was limited, but Exhibit C to the Order was Rule 1-305 of the
Commission which is a priority schedule for supply and demand
imbalance. 10 2 This regulatory program for hardship and dis-
tressed wells, enhanced recovery wells, and wells producing cas-
inghead gas and associated gas reflects the state's concern for
the potential impact of such wells on the ultimate recovery from
a reservoir. Challenges to the Corporation Commission Order
were filed almost immediately.
The regulatory program of the Oklahoma Corporation Com-
mission is depicted in the following simplified diagram:
ANR Pipeline
Priority I - -'-
Hardship Wells









In September 1986 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma declared invalid the ratable take
provision of the Oklahoma statute and the regulations of the
Commission (Rule 1-305) insofar as the regulation applied to an
interstate pipeline. 03 Although the Commission had originally
,01 Id. at 6. ("The state's exercise of its police power in promoting conservation of
its natural resources by preventing waste and protecting correlative rights has long been
recognized as a legitimate state interest.").
,01 Rule 1-305 is reproduced at 860 F.2d at 1574, n.3.
, ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W. D.
Okla. 1986), aff'd 860 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1967 (1989).
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relied on the common purchaser statute for authority to issue
Rule 1-305, it also asserted reliance on the conservation statute.
1°4
The Court held that this still invaded the exclusive federal juris-
diction. It examined the provisions invalidated in Northern Nat-
ural and Transco and focused on the "free market" rationale
for preemption. The Court concluded:
A comparison of the two regulations found unconstitutional,
Kansas Statute 55-703 and Mississippi's Rule 48, with Okla-
homa's Section 240 and Rule 1-305, compels a determination
that all three devices are intended to and do result in regulation
of the taking of gas. They seek to prevent discrimination in
favor of any one common source of supply as against another.
Such regulation allows an individual state to skew the free
market for gas. The federal policy is to allow the gas market
price to be determined by the free flow of commerce on a
national scale among the separate states. (Emphasis in origi-
nal)
105
The Corporation Commission appealed the ruling in the
ANR Pipeline case. The Tenth Circuit in affirming the trial
court' 06 concluded that Congress decided that the supply, de-
mand, and price of high cost gas were to be determined by
market forces which excluded state regulation of these areas.
0 7
The Court determined that section 240 and Rule 1-305 "are
intended to and do result in regulation of the purchase of natural
gas by interstate pipeline companies."'0 The Corporation Com-
mission could not control the private taking of gas without
interfering with FERC's regulatory responsibilities. °9
Oklahoma's regulatory scheme was not distinguishable from
the preempted regulations discussed in Northern Natural and
Transco. All state regulation of the purchasing or taking of
natural gas by interstate pipeline companies had been preempted
by the federal regulations contained in NGA and NGPA. Even
1o 643 F.Supp. at 422. The common purchaser statute is at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
52, § 240; the Conservation Statute is at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 239.
103 643 F. Supp. at 423. The court goes on to say that "Transco tells us in so many
words that this is a subject matter in which Congress has determined a national policy,
before which Oklahoma law must bow." Id. at 423-24.
1 ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 860 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1967 (1989).
1o ANR Pipeline, 860 F.2d at 1581.
Im Id.
109 Id.
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though the federal regulations do not address conservation, the
Oklahoma regulations were preempted because they created an
obstacle to full compliance with the objectives of the federal
regulation." 0 The Court rejected the assertion that Rule 1-305
constituted regulation of production, since the statute and rule
were directed at purchasers and not at producers."'
B. Other State Programs
1. Texas
Texas sets allowables on a field-by-field basis using the de-
livery capacity of a well and nominations for takes by purchas-
ers. Unlike other producing states, Texas' requirements are not
limited to determination with respect to each reservoir. Under
the Common Purchaser Act the Railroad Commission has au-
thority to compel a common purchaser pipeline company to
purchase gas produced from a reservoir from which the company
is taking no gas."12 Each purchaser's nominations must constitute
a ratable share of the purchaser's market demand for its entire
system." 3 Rule 30(f) on "Gas Nominations Required" provides
in part:
Nominations for a field by an initial nominator shall not
exceed the deliverability available to that nominator from that
field. The initial nominator shall within a pipeline system
ratably apportion without unjust or unreasonable discrimina-
tion its nominations among the various fields from which it
purchases gas. The nomination for each field shall be a con-
sistent percentage of the total deliverability of all gas wells and
the total gas limits of all oil wells from which it purchases
from all fields on its pipeline system or other apportionment
that the nominator can demonstrate will not result in unjust
or unreasonable discrimination."
4
0 Id. at 1582; see also 372 U.S. at 93.
ANR Pipeline, 860 F2d at 1582.
See Railroad Commission v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Company, 405 S.W.2d 304
(Tex. 1966).
"I See generally Anderson, The Texas Approach to Gas Proration and Ratable
Take, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 199 (1986), and Note, Natural Gas Regulation and Vested
Property Interests: Ratable Taking, Proration Standards, and Fieldwide Civil Liability,
62 TEX. L. RaEv. 691 (1983).
16 TAC . 3.30(f) (Mar. 2. 1987).
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The nominator must comply with a priority schedule. First
priority is given to casinghead gas from tertiary and secondary
recovery projects. Second priority is given to special allowable
wells so designated for the necessity of preventing waste. Third
priority is given to gas from landfill or sewage process and to
the remainder of casinghead gas so that gas produced in asso-
ciation with oil production will not be wastefully vented and oil
production shall not be unnecessarily curtailed. Fourth priority
is to a category of wells classified on the basis of their gas-oil
ratio. Fifth priority is to gas from administrative special allow-
able wells. Sixth priority is given to the remainder of gas well
gas.
15
Rule 34 of the Railroad Commission governs ratable pro-
duction and take. 1" 6 It applies to both well operators and pur-
chasers, thus providing for both ratable production and ratable
take. Subsection (c) provides:
In making purchases and accepting deliveries between fields, a
first purchaser of natural gas that purchases and accepts deliv-
ery of gas from more than one field on its same pipeline
system must accept from each field a consistent percentage of
the portion of the aggregate deliverability and total gas limits
that it is entitled to purchase from all wells from which it
purchases on its pipeline system, unless the purchaser can
demonstrate a just and reasonable basis for discriminating
between fields.'17
Subsections (d), (e), and (f) regulate the priority of takes."
l 8
The schedule of priorities under subsection (f) tracks the prior-
ities under the rule for priority of nominations." 9 The rule was
initially adopted on an emergency basis. 20 The final Rule 34 (f)
provides:
[f]irst purchasers of gas shall satisfy their pipeline system de-
mand for gas by purchasing and accepting delivery of gas from
the following priority categories in ascending numerical order.
", 16 TAC § 3.30(g) (Mar. 2, 1987).
,,6 16 TAC § 3.34 (Nov. 3, 1987).
'" Id. at § 3.34(c).
"S Id. at § 3.34(d)-(f).
,,9 Id. at § 3.34(0.
1 11 TEX. REG. 4270 (October 14, 1986); 11 TEX. REG. 4613 (November 11, 1986);
effectiveness renewed for 60-day periods 12 TEX. REG. 455 (February 10, 1987), 12 TEX.
REG. 1117 (April 7, 1987), 12 TEX. REG. 2536 (August 7, 1987).
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"Lower priority category gas" is gas from a higher numerical
category. A first purchaser shall not within its pipeline system
curtail gas from a priority category if the purchaser is pur-
chasing and accepting delivery of lower priority category gas
as a first purchaser on its same pipeline system. A first pur-
chaser's purchases and acceptance of delivery of first, second
or third priority category gas under an obligation to purchase
and accept delivery from the tailgate of a plant processing gas
to extract liquids, or from a gathering system that purchases
from wells and is required by contract or by its physical
connections to sell its gas entirely to the purchaser, whether
or not these purchases are made as a first purchaser, shall not
be curtailed if the first purchaser is purchasing and accepting
delivery of lower priority category gas as a first purchaser on
its same pipeline system. If curtailed, the curtailment must be
ratable with like priority category gas which the first purchaser
is purchasing and accepting delivery of from wells on its same
pipeline system.
121
In promulgating the new Rule 34, the Railroad Commission
took care to distinguish its statutes and regulations from those
struck down in Transco and Northern Natural. Responding to
comments that questioned the authority of the Commission, it
stated:
. . . Operators are required to produce ratably and in compli-
ance with priority categories and are forbidden to produce in
excess of market demand. Because production is dictated by a
pipeline's capacity and market demand, the section addresses
itself to an integrated system in which the production and
purchasing of natural gas are inextricable elements, regulation
of which achieves the state's legitimate conservation goals. The
regulatory requirement of ratable purchasing of gas by first
purchasers under this section is a necessary incident of the
exercise of the commission's authority to prevent waste (in-
cluding production in excess of market demand), to protect
correlative rights, to prevent discrimination, and to conserve
the natural resources of this state through ratable production.
Thus, the section avoids placing the sole enforcement burden
on purchasers, a burden which the court found violative of
the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme in Northern Nat-
ural and Transco.
That the section requires ratable production and purchases to
-2- 16 TAC § 3.34(0.
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be based on actual market demand additionally distinguishes
this section from the state rules struck down in Northern
Natural and Transco. Once market demand is determined, the
ratable production/purchase requirement imposes no greater
quantity requirement on a pipeline than it would incur absent
the rule. The rule thus does not interfere with any pipeline's
purchasing practices in violation of the NGA and the
NGPA .... 122
The Texas position is persuasive, which is not surprising
since Northern Natural and Transco are probably wrongly de-
cided. The position FERC takes in litigation regarding the Texas
program will be interesting. During oral argument in Transco,
when Justice O'Connor asked what the states could do to protect
their interests, the FERC Solicitor responsed that the states could
use a market-demand-based nomination system and cited the
Texas system as an example.
23
The Texas Railroad Commission is currently reviewing its
rules on the setting of allowables and on ratable take require-
ments. The Commission has received the report and recommen-
dations of a Gas Rules Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee




The Louisiana rateable take125 and common purchaser 26 sta-
tutes were passed in 1918, long before the provisions of the law
dealing with pooling and the establishment of well allowables.1
27
The purpose of those statutes was primarily to protect producers
from monopsonistic pipelines. 2 " The rateable take statute pro-
vides that:
whenever the full production from any common source of
supply of natural gas is in excess of the market demand, then
12 TEX. REG. 537 (February 17, 1987).
23 See Anderson, "The Texas Approach to Gas Proration and Ratable Take," 57
U. CoLo. L. REV. 199 at 212, n.67 (1986).
,2 Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 767 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1989).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.41 (West 1989).
26 Id. at § 30.42.
12 See Moosa & Saloom, The Oil and Gas Conservation Movement in Louisiana,
16 TUL. L. REv. 199, 219-222 (1942).
11 See generally id. at 212-13 (a 1906 statute making pipelines common carriers
had been ineffective).
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any person having the right to produce gas from the common
source of supply, may take therefrom only such proportion of
the natural gas that may be marketed without waste, as the
natural flow of the well or wells owned or controlled by the
person bears to the total natural flow of the common source
of supply having due regard to the acreage drained by each
well, so as to prevent the person from securing an unfair
proportion of the gas therefrom.12 9
However, the Commissioner of Conservation may permit the
taking of a greater amount whenever reasonable or equitable.
The common purchaser statute defines a common purchaser as
''every person engaged in the business of purchasing and selling
natural gas in this state." 130 The statute requires each purchaser
to take gas rateably from all wells without discrimination. 3 '
The only reported case that attempts to apply the common
purchaser statute is State v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
3 2
Arkansas Louisiana Gas was convicted of violating the Common
Purchaser Law. The company paid only $.05 per mcf to one
royalty owner and the lessee, but paid several other oil compa-
nies $. 11 per mcf for gas from the same reservoir.'33 The Louis-
iana Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that
the reference in the statute to purchasing without discrimination
did not mean price discrimination.'3 4 Instead the purpose of the
statute was to prevent quantity discrimination within a common
pool. 135
Reliance on the ratable take/common purchaser statute was
ruled out in recent years as an effective way of dealing with the
problems because of the certainty that application of the Act
would only lead to lengthy litigation and the likely intervention
of the FERC. The result of such reliance would have been that
a viable solution to the problems would only be put off for
years to come.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in the Transco decision
severely hampered the efforts of the state to prevent waste and
11 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:41 (West 1989).
,3 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:42 (West 1989).
131 Id.
12 78 So. 2d 825 (La. 1955).
' Id. at 826.
,3 Id. at 828.
131 Id. at 828-29.
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to protect valuable property rights in natural gas through ratable
take/common purchaser regulations. In Northwest Central, the
court has recognized the legitimacy of those values and goals
and has indicated that they can be protected by regulations
directed at producers.
Three possibilities suggest themselves as responses. First, a
producing state's regulations can be tailored directly to limita-
tions on the right of the operator to produce natural gas. The
problem with this approach is that it is likely to interfere more
with the working of the gas market than a ratable take order
would. By choking off all production in the reservoir to the well
with the lowest level of takes, it would limit availability of gas
to the market.
A second possibility is to reconsider the concept of the rule
of capture, perhaps to recognize in the appropriate case that
conversion takes place when a pipeline causes uncompensated
drainage. Such an approach has already been recognized within
the context of the multiple owners of production from a single
well, 136 but state legislation may be required in order to extend
the idea to a situation involving multiple wells competing for
production in a common source of supply.
Third, a state could stick by its regulations and wait for the
United States Supreme Court to review the regulations in light
of Northwest Central. With the changes that have taken place
at the Court and with the gas market substantially different now
than when Transco arose in 1982, the chances of a decision more
favorable to the producing states are substantial. A reconsider-
ation and reversal of Transco would be the most desirable con-
clusion of the unfortunate chapter of natural gas history that
dates from the Phillips and Northern Natural decisions.
136 See generally Teel v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 767 P.2d 391 (Okla.
1985; reh'g denied 1989) (purchaser who knowingly accepted gas from an operator
unauthorized to deliver) and Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 58 Okla. B.J. 2603
(Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (the purchaser was obligated to pay the royalty owners, not the
operator of the wells).

